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Abstract. Component fault trees that contain safety basic events as
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basic events are rated with probabilities in an interval [0,1], for security
basic events simpler scales such as {low, medium, high} make more sense.
In this paper an approach is described how to handle a quantitative safety
analysis with different rating schemes for safety and security basic events.
By doing so, it is possible to take security causes for safety failures into
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1 Introduction
Embedded systems are networked more and more, they evolve into cyber-physical
systems, even if the initial design did not anticipate this. This networking cre-
ates new security problems that can lead to safety problems which have to be
analyzed. The effects of such security problems are not taken into account in
a traditional safety analysis. Thus consequences cannot be estimated correctly,
which results in either insufficient or unnecessary and too expensive countermea-
sures.
This paper shows how to conduct a qualitative and quantitative safety analy-
sis using component fault trees (CFTs), including the effects of security problems
on system safety. In [16] the process as a whole was described. In this current
paper the focus lies on the analysis of the security enhanced component fault
trees (SECFTs). To achieve that, safety analysis methods of CFTs are extended
to incorporate security problems as basic causes.
The paper is structured in the following way: After a short overview of re-
lated work, the overall analysis process is recalled. Then the foundations of an
analysis are set by discussing rating scheme and calculation rules. And finally
the qualitative and quantitative analysis procedure is shown using an example
analysis of a generic patient controlled analgesia (GPCA) pump.
2 Related Work
The SECFTs used in this approach are CFTs [11] extended with additional
elements from attack trees (ATs) [15] to model the effects of security attacks on
the safety of a system. Based on established analysis methods for CFTs that are
described in [18], adaptations were made to encompass the analysis of safety as
well as security properties.
Other works concerning quantitative analysis of ATs like Mauw et al. [12]
describe general calculating rules for predicates in ATs to compute the values for
the top event (TE). Jürgenson and Willemson use those rules to calculate ratings
in an AT in [10]. They use a combination of probabilities and costs/gain of the
attacks. Fovino et al. propose in [6] a way how to combine quantitative analysis of
fault trees (FTs) and ATs under the precondition that probabilities for all basic
events (BEs) are available. But determining accurate probabilities for security
attacks is often difficult or sometimes even not possible [17]. To circumvent that
problem, Casals et al. use a scale with discrete values to rate security attacks
in [5]. By those ratings they can compare different attack scenarios. The downside
is that the accuracy is not as good as with probabilities for BEs in FTs.
Therefore, we decided to use a hybrid approach for the rating of the events
to avoid the problem of assigning probabilities to security-related events. The
overall process of the combined analysis was described in [7] and [16]. It is
based on recommendations of standards as IEC 61025 [3] or IEC 60300–3–1 [2]
to use a combination of inductive and deductive techniques to minimize the
potential of omitted failure modes. Inductive techniques as failure mode and
effects analysis (FMEA) [9] or hazard and operability study (HAZOP) [1] can
be used to find the TEs. Deductive techniques as fault tree analysis (FTA) [3]
are used to refine the analysis and to find causes and moreover combinations of
causes that lead to the TE. The resulting graph is used to conduct qualitative
and quantitative analyses.
The approach to introduce security aspects into safety analysis proposed
in this work is based on CFTs. It extends the process described earlier by an
additional step and modifies the analysis step [16]. After developing the CFT,
it is extended by security attacks as additional causes that also could lead to
the safety-related TE. Those security attacks are found by analyzing data flow
and interface specifications, because most attacks are made at communication
interfaces. Techniques such as STRIDE [8] and FMVEA [14] can be used to find
possible attacks.
3 Analysis
To be able to conduct a quantitative analysis, a comprehensive rating of all of the
events in a security enhanced component fault tree (SECFT) has to be available.
Using a comprehensive rating for all events the individual impact of an attack
on the occurrence of the top event (TE) can be determined.
3.1 Ratings
In component fault trees (CFTs) typical ratings for basic events (BEs) are prob-
abilities or reliability values. These are used to calculate the respective values
for minimal cut sets (MCSs) and the TE.
In an attack tree (AT) the same basic elements exist as in a CFT. Either
Boolean or continuous values can be assigned to BEs. As Boolean values pairs
such as possible – impossible or expensive – not expensive are used. Continuous
values for BEs can be costs to execute an attack, probability of success of a given
attack or probability that an attack is actually conducted.
A probability that an attack is successful could be determined from expert
knowledge and experienced data just like failure probabilities. But even the
success probability is difficult to determine. There is only a small portion of the
data about successful attacks available. Most successful attacks are not published
because companies fear the loss of trust of their customers.
The bigger problem is determining the probability that an attacker actually
conducts an attack. First of all, this probability depends on different aspects:
the attacker’s motivation and experience, availability of assets/money, and ac-
cessibility of the system. And second of all, if this attack requires several distinct
actions that are modeled as separate security events, these events are not inde-
pendent, as it would be required for most calculation algorithms for CFTs.
Fig. 1 shows an example of an attacker modeled as a component with two
output ports out1 and out2. For the output port out2 it is basically an AT which
consists of 4 gates and 5 BEs. Two MCSs for out2 are present which represent
two different attack scenarios: {e1, e2, e5} and {e3, e4, e5}.
If an attack is consisting of several actions an attacker has to perform, like
the ones for output port out2 in the example, these actions are not stochastically
independent. If an attacker plans to attack a given system and that attack re-
quires him to execute different actions (security events, sub-attacks), it is most
likely that he will at least try all sub-attacks that are necessary to reach his goal.
In terms of the given example this means if an attacker chooses to try BE e1
and he succeeds, he most probably will also try e2 and e5. In general this means,
in an AT the events in a MCS are not independent from each other.
Therefore, it makes more sense to assign a probability to a whole MCS, which
represents the attack, instead of the BEs. The other rating values (other than
probabilities) can be calculated for the MCSs from their respective BEs. For the
TE the same conditions hold than for CFTs: ratings are calculated from BEs or
MCSs.
A first result from a safety analysis based on SECFTs is the set of MCSs as
they are all combinations of BEs that lead to the analyzed system failure. To
decide which of these combinations have to be mitigated to reach a certain safety
level, this set of MCSs has to be prioritized. And of course to decide whether a
system is complying to a given safety level from a standard or a requirement,
the TE rating of the CFT has to be calculated.
Instead of trying to assign probabilities to security events, it is a better idea
to use a more coarse scale with only a few discrete values. IEC 61025 [3] states
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out1: tampering: change output value too high
e6: tampering: change output value too high
access LAN
e1: find LAN access port
e2: spoof MAC address
access WLAN
gain access to private network
gain access to target system
out2: tampering: change controller data
e3: find WLAN
e4: break WPA key
e5: get credentials
>=1
Fig. 1. Example attacker component.
for fault tree analysis that in case when probabilities cannot be assigned to
BEs, a “descriptive likelihood of occurrence” can be used with values such as:
“highly probable”, “very probable”, “medium probability”, “remote probability”,
etc. Likelihood is defined as a qualitative probability for the occurrence of a se-
curity event. Security events are in most cases attacks conducted by an attacker.
This likelihood can be used to rate security events in a SECFT.
The approach described in this paper can work with different numbers of
distinct values. In the following a three-value scale is selected for simplicity. More
fine-grained scales only make sense if more distinct values are needed explicitly.
One has to keep in mind that assigning more precise numerical values might
only add fictitious precision which can be misleading in the interpretation of the
results. This also has to be considered when calculating values for combinations
of events that are rated with likelihood values.
The values of that likelihood are determined from several indicators as: attack
cost, attack resources, attacker motivation, accessibility, or attacker type. Casals
et al. describe in [5] one possibility to determine likelihood values. The scale
represents the likelihood of a security event to occur. To each value a numerical
value is assigned for easier comparisons. From this follows that the likelihood
would be mapped to integer values from the interval [1,m], where m ∈ N is the
number of discrete values.
One possibility to achieve a common rating, other than probabilities, is to use
the likelihood for both safety and security events. The advantage of this approach
is that values for all BEs can be determined relatively easy and comparisons of
likelihood are easily performed. The disadvantage is that the accuracy coming
from rating safety events with probabilities is lost.
To use the advantages of both, probabilities for safety events and likelihood
for security events, an approach using a combination of both probability and like-
lihood is used. Hence in a SECFT there can be both likelihoods and probabilities
for different events.
When MCSs are determined in a SECFT that includes safety as well as
security events, there can be three types of MCSs as defined in the following:
Definition 1 MCS types:
1. A safety MCS contains only safety events (BEs which occur due to random
faults in the system).
2. A security MCS contains only security events (BEs which are triggered from
outside the system by a malicious attacker or a random fault).
3. A mixed MCS contains safety events as well as security events.
The TE will most certainly depend on safety as well as security events. There-
fore a combination of both probabilities and likelihood is needed to calculate
ratings for MCSs and TEs.
Events in a safety MCS are rated with probabilities. Therefore, the overall
rating of a safety MCS is also a probability. Events in a security MCS are rated
with likelihoods. So the overall rating of a security MCS is also a likelihood.
In a mixed MCS however, there are both probabilities and likelihoods. As they
are not directly comparable, the rating of a mixed MCS is a tuple consisting of
the overall probability of all included safety events and the overall likelihood of
all included security events. For TEs in a SECFT, the same holds as for mixed
MCSs.
The next section will introduce the extensions for the calculation rules needed
for a SECFT to handle the tuples of probabilities and likelihoods.
3.2 Calculation Rules for Likelihood and Probability Values in
SECFTs
For the calculation of the ratings from Section 3.1 at least calculation rules for
the gates AND, OR, and NOT are required. Other gates such as XOR or voter gates
can be constructed from these three basic gates. Their calculation rules result
from the combination accordingly.
Definition 2 (Likelihood of an AND-gate) All subordinate events have to oc-
cur in order that the combined event occurs. Therefore, the event with the lowest
likelihood determines the likelihood L of the combined event. This is explained by
the fact, that if all events of an AND-gate have to occur, the one with the lowest
likelihood also has to occur, which then determines the overall likelihood of the
AND-gate.
Definition 3 (Likelihood of an OR-gate) At least one subordinate event has
to occur in order that the combined event occurs. If there are alternatives to
attack a system to trigger the same event, an attacker will execute the one that
has the highest outcome while requiring the lowest effort. In other words he will
execute the attack action with the highest likelihood.
Definition 4 (Likelihood of a NOT-gate) A subordinate event must not occur
in order that the resulting event occurs. If the likelihood L is defined as an interval
[1,m] of integer values with m ∈ N, the value of a NOT gate is defined as follows:
L(A) = (m+ 1)− L(A)
The outcome of AND, OR and NOT gates with independent input events A,B,
or more general n independent input events Xi, is calculated as follows in Table 1
with i, n,m ∈ N:
Table 1. Probability and likelihood calculation for AND, OR, and NOT-gates.
probability likelihood
AND P (A ∧B) = P (A) · P (B) L(A ∧B) = min[L(A), L(B)]
P
(∧n
i=1Xi
)
=
∏n
i=1 P (Xi) L
(∧n
i=1Xi
)
= minni=1[L(Xi)]
OR P (A ∨B) = P (A) + P (B)− P (A) · P (B) L(A ∨B) = max[L(A), L(B)]
P
(∨n
i=1Xi
)
= 1−∏ni=1(1− P (Xi)) L (∨ni=1Xi) = maxni=1[L(Xi)]
NOT P (A) = 1− P (A) L(A) = (m+ 1)− L(A)
If the NOT gate is used it has to be considered that it has an unusual semantics
in CFTs: The lower the probability/likelihood of occurrence of an event that is
attached to a NOT gate, the higher is its effect on the TE, and vice versa. Whereas
normally high probabilities of single events lead to a higher probability for the
TE. From this follows that to reduce the TE probability/likelihood, an event
or even a whole component that is connected via a NOT has to fail with high
probability/likelihood.
To have a uniform rating scheme over all events in a CFT, all ratings of BEs
are interpreted as tuples (P,L), where P is a probability and L a likelihood.
For safety events there is no likelihood leading to (Pe,−) with an undefined Le,
and for security events there is no probability value leading to (−, Le) with an
undefined Pe. Undefined values will be ignored in the calculation of the rating.
This has to be explained further: The alternative to undefined values would
be values that do not influence the order between the events. To achieve this,
an identity element or neutral element for all possible gate-operations would be
needed. This would mean in terms of probabilities, a value is needed, which is
the identity element for addition and multiplication. Such a value does not exist
because the identity element for the addition is 0, and the identity element for
the multiplication is 1. The same problem arises for the likelihood operations:
The identity element of the min-function is the maximum value, and the identity
element of the max-function is the minimum value. These values exclude each
other, so no value is selected and the undefined values are ignored during the
calculation.
The tuple elements of a combination of events by logic gates are calculated
independent of each other according to the rules established earlier. The follow-
ing example illustrates this in more detail. Fig. 2 shows a high-level view of a
SECFT of a generic patient controlled analgesia pump [4] with all modeled com-
ponents. The security part is inspired from the security flaw of the infusion pump
Hospira PCA3 that was published recently [13]. To include the attack, extra in-
put ports were added to vulnerable components. The actual attack is modeled
in component Attacker. Suitable ratings for all basic events were chosen. The
required Safety Integrity Level for the individual components was estimated and
used as order of magnitude for the rating of the safety events. The rating of the
security events was chosen due to the simplicity of the physical access (attach
an Ethernet cable) and telnet access (no authentication necessary to get root
access). The likelihood for the security events in this example is a three-level
scale of {low, medium, high} with corresponding values of {1,2,3}. The model
has 7 MCSs. Their resulting ratings are shown in Table 2.
Fig. 2. High-level SECFT model of a generic infusion pump.
The rating of the TE can be calculated as a conservative estimate from a
disjunction of all MCSs. The undefined values P2 and L1, L3, L4, L5, L6, L7 are
Table 2. Minimal cut sets and ratings.
id basic events BE rating MCS rating
1 PumpUnit.pump unit sets wrong values 10−7 (10−7,−)
2 Attacker.physical access the Ethernet interface of the pump 3 (high) ( − , 3)
Attacker.access telnet service of the pump 3 (high)
3 UserInput.user sets wrong values 10−6 (10−13,−)
PumpUnit.check of user input fails 10−7
4 PumpDriver.pump driver fails 10−8 (10−15,−)
Alarm.alarm fails 10−7
5 PumpDriver.pump driver fails 10−8 (10−15,−)
ErrorHandler.error handler fails 10−7
6 PumpDriver.pump driver fails 10−8 (10−15,−)
FlowRateMonitor.flow rate monitor fails 10−7
7 PumpDriver.pump driver fails 10−8 (10−15,−)
PumpSensors.sensors provide wrong values 10−7
ignored in this calculation.
PTE = P (
∨
iMCSi)
= 1−∏i(1− P (MCSi)), i ∈ 1, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7
= 1.00000103975262 · 10−7
LTE = max(L(MCS2))
= max(3) = 3
That results in a rating of (PTE , LTE) = (1.00000103975262 · 10−7, 3) for the
TE wrong dosage and no alarm.
3.3 Qualitative Analysis
The most important activity of a qualitative analysis in CFTs and SECFTs is the
determination of MCSs. MCSs also are used to derive a coarse classification of the
criticality of failure scenarios and BEs, and they allow to make statements about
the general endangerment of the analyzed system. MCSs are also an important
starting point for a following quantitative analysis. Based on the MCSs also a
basic importance analysis of BEs and MCSs can be conducted.
This Section deals with necessary extensions of the qualitative analysis of
CFTs to cope with additional security events in the SECFT. The first step of
the analysis is the determination and analysis of the MCSs. The interpretation
of a MCS is the same as in CFTs: a MCS is a minimal safety failure scenario (but
possibly depending also on security attacks). A CFT (and therefore a SECFT as
well) can be transformed into a set of MCSs that represents all failure scenarios
which are relevant for the system. In general, a tree contains multiple MCSs
corresponding to different failure scenarios.
In addition to size, an analysis of MCSs of a SECFT takes also the type of
the MCSs into account. The result of a qualitative analysis are ordered lists of
MCSs.
As discussed in detail in Sections 3.1 and 3.2, ratings of safety and security
events cannot be compared directly. Therefore, it makes sense to sort them
according to safety events and security events. Then, one receives three lists of
MCSs (Definition 1):
1. safety MCS
2. security MCS
3. mixed MCS
Safety MCSs are analyzed as usual: A qualitative analysis starts with an
ordering according to the size of the MCS. The smaller a MCS the more critically
it should be analyzed. This is explained by the fact that all events in a MCS
have to occur, so that the TE occurs and the system fails. The lesser events have
to occur, the more the TE depends on individual events. So events in smaller
MCSs deserve more attention in an analysis. An especially critical case is a MCS
with only one event – a single point of failure which itself can directly lead to
the system failure.
Security MCSs are a more special case: In this case a system failure only
depends on external influences and does not depend on failures of internal sys-
tem components. Pure security MCSs are not more critical per se than pure
safety MCSs, but the uncertainty of the modeling of an attack is relatively high.
Depending on the threat scenario and the attacker type the likelihood value
changes. Necessary tools become better available and cheaper over time which
can make an attack more probable in the future. Also, the attacker type, the
attacker’s motivation and capabilities can and will change over time – poten-
tially to the disadvantage of the system. This is why pure security MCSs should
be avoided by adding suitable countermeasures which convert security MCSs to
mixed MCSs.
Mixed MCSs on the other hand can be managed better: For the occurrence
of the TE all events of a mixed MCS have to occur, which means regular safety
events have to occur. These occurrences of safety events can be managed with
the usual methods like redundancy or monitoring. The probability for a mixed
MCS to cause the TE has an upper bound: the probability of the contained
safety events. This way the criticality of security events can be mitigated by
safety events with low probability. That means, the more statistically indepen-
dent safety events a MCS contains the less probable it is to cause the TE.
To summarize the qualitative analysis of MCSs: There are three types of
MCSs which differ in the level of controllability of their BEs. Controllability in
this context means how much a failure scenario (a MCS) depends on faults of
the system as opposed to external factors as e.g. attacks. In descending order
according to their controllability these are: safety MCSs, mixed MCSs and se-
curity MCSs. Resulting from that, additionally to MCSs containing only one
event (single points of failure) also plain security MCSs should be avoided by
adding more (safety) BEs. Also, the more MCSs exist in a given SECFT, the
more opportunities for the TE exist, which indicates a higher vulnerability of
the system with respect to this TE.
Another goal of an analysis is to determine the importance of BEs. The
importance shows how much of an impact a BE has on a TE. BEs that are part
of more than one MCS are more important than the ones that are only part of
one MCS. But the size of MCSs is also a factor. BEs in smaller MCSs are more
important than the ones in larger MCSs. More accurate importance analysis is
possible within a quantitative analysis.
3.4 Quantitative Analysis
A quantitative analysis is conducted if more accurate statements about the sys-
tem safety are necessary than the results from a qualitative analysis, which are
mainly the determination and preliminary ordering of MCSs. A quantitative
analysis, therefore, has several goals [18,3]:
– to determine the rating of the TE under consideration to compare it to the
given requirements from standards or customers,
– to determine ratings of the individual MCSs to determine the MCS that has
the biggest contribution to the TE (the most probable failure scenario),
– and derived from the previous ones: to determine where countermeasures
would have the most effect.
A quantitative analysis of a SECFT starts with a quantitative evaluation
of its MCSs. The first step here is to assign probabilities to safety events and
likelihoods to security events. (During the assignment of likelihood values to
security events it should be kept in mind that those security events belonging to
the same MCS can influence each other.)
After the determination of the MCSs there are two possibilities to order them:
according to size and type (see qualitative analysis in Section 3.3) or according
to type and ratings (probability and likelihood). An ordering simply according to
the ratings is not possible for all MCSs in general because of the incomparabil-
ity of probabilities and likelihoods (see also Section 3.1). For each MCS a tuple
rating (P,L) is calculated according to the rules described in Section 3.2. For
probabilities this means the value for the MCS is the product of all probabilities
of the contained events. (Under the precondition that all events are indepen-
dent, which is usually given for safety events.) For the likelihood of a MCS the
minimum of all likelihoods of the included events is determined.
Each type of MCSs can be ordered by itself. To compare two minimal cut
setsMCS1 andMCS2 with tuple ratings (P1, L1) and (P2, L2), the ordering has
to be prioritized either according to probability or to likelihood. The resulting
ordered list of MCSs reflects the relative criticality of the represented failure
scenarios. Higher ratings here correspond to a higher criticality and vice versa.
To find out if the system complies with the given requirements, the list of MCSs
is filtered according to the requirements (e.g.: “show me all MCSs with size ≤ 2”,
“P > 10−7” or “L ≥ 2(medium)”). The results are the failure scenarios that
require countermeasures.
As mentioned earlier, requirements can define boundary values for MCSs in
size or rating, but usually the main requirement is a boundary value for the rating
of the TEs: “the system shall not fail with a probability more than . . . ” The TE
probability can be calculated as the sum of the probabilities of all MCSs if only
AND and OR gates are used. This defines an upper bound for the probability:
P (TE) ≤
n∑
i=1
P (MCSi) , i, n ∈ N, n number of MCSs (1)
The other variant is to calculate P (TE) using the binary decision diagram (BDD)
algorithm which returns the exact probability value. To adapt the BDD algo-
rithm to SECFTs only the BEs with an assigned probability value are considered
for the calculation as already discussed in Section 3.2.
The likelihood of the TE L(TE) is simply calculated as the maximum of the
likelihoods of all MCSs as defined in the equations for the OR-gate:
L(TE) = L
(
n∨
i=1
Xi
)
=
n
max
i=1
[L(Xi)] , i, n ∈ N, n number of MCSs (2)
With the described extensions of the calculation rules and the different types
of MCSs SECFTs can be used to conduct safety analysis with additional con-
sideration of security problems.
4 Conclusion
Based on SECFTs a qualitative and quantitative safety analysis is extended to
include influences of security problems on the safety of a system. To avoid the
problem how to assign probabilities to security events, a scale of discrete values
(e.g. {low, medium, high}) is used to rate security events while retaining the
higher accuracy of probabilities for safety events. Existing analysis techniques
are extended to work with probabilities for safety events as well as discrete
likelihoods for security events. As a result, a hybrid rating scheme is used to rank
the different MCSs according to the tuple of probability and likelihood, and to
calculate TE ratings that can be used to check the compliance of requirements.
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